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Abstract 
This paper tests the opportunity-cost theory using a panel of Spanish firms during the period 
1991-2010. Under this theory, productivity-enhancing activities, such as R&D investment, 
should increase during downturns because of the fall in their relative cost – in terms of 
forgone output –. This would imply that business cycles may have a (positive) long-term 
impact on productivity growth. In the spirit of Aghion et al. (2007) we allow the impact of the 
cycle on R&D to vary between firms with different access to credit, finding that credit 
constraints may reverse the countercyclicality of R&D, even if it is optimal for them. We go 
one step further and explore whether other productivity-enhancing activities, like on-the-job 
training and the purchase of patents, follow a similar pattern. We find that on-the-job training 
expenditures are countercyclical and, unlike R&D investment, credit constraints seem not to 
affect their cyclical behaviour. Investments in other intangibles, such as patent purchases, 
are found to be acyclical, also irrespective of financial constraints, which could suggest 
some kind of substitution between R&D and patent purchases over the cycle. Finally, 
complementarities between the different intangible investments and the traditional productive 
factors (labour and capital) are also investigated via production function estimates, in order to 
assess potential indirect effects of the cycle on long-run growth. 
Keywords: R&D, business cycle, credit constraints, panel data. 





Este trabajo contrasta la teoría del coste de oportunidad utilizando un panel de empresas 
españolas para el período 1991-2010. Según esta teoría, las actividades que mejoran la 
productividad empresarial, como por ejemplo la inversión en I+D, deberían aumentar durante  
la fase baja del ciclo, ya que su coste relativo en términos del producto final que se deja de 
producir cae. Este hecho podría implicar que los ciclos económicos pueden tener un impacto 
(positivo) sobre el crecimiento de la productividad a largo plazo. En línea con la importante 
contribución de Aghion et al. (2007), realizamos un ejercicio empírico en el que permitimos que 
el efecto del ciclo económico sobre el gasto en I+D varíe entre empresas con distinta 
capacidad de acceder a la financiación externa, y encontramos que las restricciones crediticias 
pueden llegar a revertir la contraciclicidad de la I+D, aunque ello no sea lo óptimo para la 
empresa. En este trabajo se da un paso más y se explora si existen otras actividades 
beneficiosas para la productividad empresarial, como el gasto en formación o la adquisición 
del derecho de uso de patentes, que siguen un patrón cíclico similar al de la I+D. Los resultados 
apuntan a que el gasto en formación de las empresas es contracíclico y, a diferencia de la 
inversión en I+D, dicho patrón no parece verse afectado por la presencia de restricciones 
financieras. La inversión en otros activos intangibles, como las compras de patentes, resulta 
ser acíclica, también con independencia de las restricciones de crédito, lo que podría sugerir 
cierto grado de sustituibilidad entre la inversión en I+D y las compras de patentes a lo largo  
del ciclo económico. Finalmente, también se estudian las complementariedades entre los 
diferentes tipos de inversión en activos intangibles y los factores productivos tradicionales 
(trabajo y capital físico) mediante la estimación de una función de producción translog, con el 
objeto de valorar la existencia de potenciales efectos indirectos del ciclo económico sobre  
el crecimiento a largo plazo a través de la acumulación del factor trabajo y el capital físico. 
Palabras claves: I+D, ciclo real, restricciones de crédito, datos de panel. 
Códigos JEL: O3, E32, D22, C23. 
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1 Introduction 
Since the 1990s a lot of theoretical and empirical papers have attempted to shed some light 
on how business cycles affect long-term productivity growth. The learning-by-doing theory, 
for example, claims that people have ideas on how to improve production efficiency precisely 
when they are producing, a process that is more intense during economic booms. Hence, 
economic booms (recessions) would have positive (negative) long-term effects on 
productivity. There are other theories, however, that claim that recessions could have a 
positive effect on long-term growth. One of them is the creative destruction theory, based  
on the original work of Schumpeter in the 1930s, and revived by Caballero and Hammour 
(1994). The theory states that recessions are times at which factors of production shift from 
(old) less productive units to more productive (new) ones, which, in turn, has a positive effect 
on aggregate productivity.  
Reorganisation can also take place at the firm level. In this respect the opportunity-cost 
theory claims that limited resources within the firm can be devoted to production or to productivity-
enhancing activities (PEA), such as the reorganisation of production, on-the-job training or research 
and development. These activities detract resources from current production i.e. they are costly in 
terms of forgone production, and their benefit extends into the future. Given the fall in revenue from 
normal productive activities during recessions, the opportunity costs of such activities will be at 
their lowest in times of crisis. Hence, the opportunity-cost theory claims that it will be optimal for 
firms to devote more of their limited resources to PEA during recessions, the result of which could 
be an increase in long-term productivity growth.1  
Most of the empirical tests of this theory concentrate on R&D spending, one of the 
most important PEA. R&D activities are labour and finance intensive and, therefore, as stated 
by the opportunity-cost approach, can (add) detract labour resources from other productive 
activities during the (expansionary) contractionary phase of the business cycle.2 The forgone 
cost in terms of output of such activities would fall during recessions and, therefore, we would 
expect firms to devote more resources to R&D in such troubled times. In other words, R&D  
is expected to be countercyclical. 
There are many papers studying the cyclical properties of R&D expenditures – and 
other PEA – both at the micro and macro level. As regards the latter, the first vintage  
of papers – see footnote 1 – analysed the effect of cycles on aggregate TFP growth, 
understood as the result of some unspecified PEA, and tended to find broad support for 
the opportunity-cost approach.3 However, the most recent empirical literature, which 
                                                                          
1. The opportunity-cost theory developed from contributions by Bean (1990), Hall (1991), Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998), 
Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and Galí and Hammour (1993).  
2. See Saint-Paul (1997) for a discussion of the conditions under which a trade-off between production and  
PEA may exist, and in particular, its relationship with the theory of labour hoarding. As a matter of fact, many of the 
employees involved in R&D are not scientists, but support staff who could be employed in other parts of  
the production process. According to statistics from Eurostat, the share of researchers in total personnel devoted  
to R&D activities in the Spanish business sector is about 44.4Ԝ%, the share of technicians is 37.7Ԝ% and the share of 
support staff is 17.9Ԝ%. This notwithstanding, as far as we know, there are no papers documenting the fact that R&D 
personnel are shifted from research activities to production activities during booms, and vice versa. This could be an  
avenue that deserves future research. 
3. These papers usually used a semi-structural VAR approach due to the endogenous nature of both economic cycles 
and productivity, in the spirit of Blanchard and Quah (1989). Estrada and Montero (2009) find evidence that private R&D 
is countercyclical in Spain using a SVAR approach in which the endogenous variables are real GDP, the GDP deflator, 
business sector R&D and public sector R&D. 
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usually adopts a single-equation framework, typically finds a procyclical relationship 
between R&D spending and aggregate output (see Geroski and Walters, 1995; Rafferty, 
2003; Wälde and Woitek, 2004; and Comin and Gertler, 2006 for a sample of 
representative papers and the references therein).  
As for the microeconomic literature, which is the relevant branch for our paper, there 
are a number of papers that study the cyclicality of R&D with conflicting results. One of the most 
prominent is Barlevy (2007), who constructs and calibrates a model where R&D expenditures 
are procyclical due to the presence of dynamic spillovers. Those spillovers result in limited 
appropriability of new products, which means that there is only a short window of time to 
appropriate profits from innovation. Hence, firms will introduce new products when they can 
extract the highest benefits, that is, when market conditions are optimal (i.e. booming).  
On the other hand, recent major contributions by Aghion and co-authors (2007, 
2010) explain this apparent contradiction between the empirical evidence and what we 
would expect from the opportunity-cost theory through the existence of credit constraints.4 
If a firm depends on external resources to perform R&D activities, when the bad times 
come its ability to borrow in order to innovate will be reduced, given the drop in current 
earnings. The consequence is that a negative shock should affect more R&D investments 
and innovation in firms that are more credit constrained. They test this possibility using a 
panel of French firms for the period 1993-2004, and find that in the absence of credit 
constraints, the share of investment in R&D at the firm level moves countercyclically, as 
expected by the opportunity-cost theory. However, when one allows that effect to vary 
between firms which are financially constrained and those which are not, the result 
changes: the R&D investment share turns procyclical in firms that are more dependent on 
external sources for financing innovation. This same result is also found, using the CIS 
database, by Bovha-Padilla et al. (2009) for Slovenian firms. 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the microeconomic literature on testing the 
opportunity-cost approach extended with the presence of liquidity constraints by expanding 
the analysis in several directions. In the spirit of Aghion et al. (2007), we study how the 
existence of credit constraints affects the cyclicality of R&D expenditures of Spanish firms 
during the period 1991-2010, a broader period than that considered in Aghion et al. (2007), 
which allows us to include the 1991-1993 crisis and, above all, the first three years of the 
current financial crisis.  
Secondly, and given the previous discussion, we study whether other PEA follow a 
cyclical pattern in line with what one would expect according to the opportunity-cost theory. 
To this end, we expand our analysis to explore the cyclicality of training spending or patent 
purchases. As regards on-the-job training, in recessions it may be optimal for firms to devote 
some of the working time of their hoarded labour to build up human capital rather than to 
produce, given the lower opportunity cost of the former. As to the purchase of patents, most 
of the empirical work focuses on in-house R&D activity, but firms can also buy the right to use 
and exploit the results of others’ R&D activity. The inclusion of such source of innovative 
                                                                          
4. Another relevant explanation of the observed procyclicallity of R&D is offered in Ouyang (2011). She argues that there is an 
aggregation bias in the studies of the cyclical behavior of aggregate R&D. If aggregate R&D is dominated by the movements 
of a certain industry which is not synchronised with aggregate fluctuations, we could see that in aggregate terms R&D is 
procyclical but, at the level of the industry, R&D is moving countercyclically, as suggested by the opportunity-cost theory. 
Further, using industry-level data for the US she finds evidence consistent with the hypothesis of the existence of financial 
constraints, since the response of R&D to output is negative for positive demand shocks, but negative for a contractionary 
demand shock, due to decreases in firms’ net worth and therefore tighter liquidity constraints. 
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activity at the firm level is of interest given the lower cost of patent purchases, relative to in-
house R&D activity, and therefore, the possibility to substitute one for the other in times of 
financial difficulties.5, 6  
The results of our analysis are consistent with those in Aghion et al. (2007): in  
the absence of credit constraints, firm-level R&D activity is countercyclical, that is, the 
opportunity-cost theory is confirmed. However, if we allow the effect of the cycle to vary 
depending on the probability of facing financial obstacles, we find that this result only holds 
for those firms with lower credit constraints.  
Moreover, as regards other PEA, in the case of on-the-job training, it follows the 
same countercyclical pattern as R&D, but credit constraints are of no relevance in this 
respect. Lastly, investment in other intangibles, such as the purchase of patents, is much less 
sensitive to the cycle than R&D activity (or on-the-job training). This suggests the possibility 
that firms substitute one type of investment in intangibles for others in bad times. 
Thirdly, and given the novelty of this last finding, we devote a whole section of the 
paper to the potential existence of indirect effects of business cycles on long-run growth 
stemming from the pattern of complementarities and substitutabilities among the different 
productive factors. We find that R&D capital and labour are complements, whereas R&D 
capital and physical capital are substitutes in the production function. Finally, we find mild 
evidence of substitutability between in-house R&D capital and intangible capital not produced 
within the firm (linked to knowledge accumulated through the purchase of patents).  
Additionally, another novelty of our paper relates to the construction of the proxy for 
credit constraints, which implies matching two databases. The main source of information is 
the “Central de Balances” (CBSO – Central Balance Sheet Data Office) of the Banco de 
España. This database contains detailed balance sheet information on investments in tangible 
and intangible assets, financial situation, characteristics of the labour force and other variables 
of interest, such as spending on R&D and training, for a sample of over 3,200 Spanish firms 
during the period 1991-2010. However, as it has long been established in the literature, 
balance sheet based indices of financial constraints, like cash-flow measures, might present 
some limitations (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Whited and Wu, 2006). Given the importance 
for our analysis of correctly measuring financial constraints, we have used survey data which, 
combined with the balance sheet data, has enabled us to construct a reliable indicator of 
innovation-related financing obstacles for all firms in the CBSO sample. More concretely, we 
use the specific answers about obstacles to innovation reported to the Spanish Technological 
Innovation Panel (PITEC) to estimate the probability of being financially constrained for firms in 
the CBSO database. 
                                                                          
5. The percentage of firms claiming to invest in other intangibles such as the purchase of patents or licenses is about 
30Ԝ% in our sample, hence it is not negligible. It is true, however, that the amount invested is small, about 0.04Ԝ% of total 
investment in p75 (5Ԝ% on average). Lastly, the average size of firms investing in these types of intangibles is very large, 
and they have around 1,200, employees compared with firms with 800 employees which invest in training. 
6. Some authors have also focused their attention on non-R&D PEAs. Nickell et al. (1995) used survey data to explore, for a 
very limited sample of UK firms, the causality between profit growth and the introduction of managerial reorganisation and 
new technologies. They find that worsening performance tends to be followed by an increase in the probability of the firm 
introducing new technology as well as other managerial and organisational changes. However, higher financial pressure only 
decreases the likelihood of introducing new technology, while it has no significant impact on other changes in organisation or 
human resource practices. Geroski and Gregg (1995) consider the effect of recessions on other intangible investments, such 
as training and marketing spending. They find that these expenditures are more sensitive to cyclical pressures than 
investments in implementing product or process innovations, but less sensitive than investment in plant and equipment. This 
notwithstanding, their analysis is unconditional and does not consider specific firms’ characteristics that might distort those 
investment choices, such as the degree of credit constraints. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the two 
datasets we combine to perform the analysis and details the construction of the direct 
indicator of financial obstacles. Section 3 studies the cyclicality of R&D expenditures  
using several measures of firms’ R&D activities and section 4 expands the analysis to  
include investment in other intangibles. Section 5 studies in more depth the 
substitution/complementarity of the different factors of production, putting special emphasis 
on the relationships between the different investments in intangibles and, finally, section 6 
presents the conclusions. 
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2 Data and issues in measuring financial constraints 
2.1 The Banco de España's CBSO 
In this paper we use firm-level information from the Banco de España's CBSO. Since 1983, 
the CBSO has been compiling and publishing aggregate information of reporting firms’ 
balance sheets in order to follow the economic situation of the Spanish private non-financial 
sector. The information is provided on a voluntary basis every year by a substantial number of 
established companies, which amounted to 9,000 non-financial firms in 2007 ("reporting 
firms").7 The reporting firms fill in a questionnaire with detailed accounting information, as well 
as some other additional information on employment, breakdown of the workforce in terms of 
skills, type of contracts, spending on training or, since 1991, R&D expenditures. The 
information for the current and the previous period is provided every year to improve  
the quality of the data and reduce omissions. Moreover, about 75Ԝ% of the firms are 
contacted again to clarify certain data or fill in gaps, and more than 200 basic quality controls 
are run on a routine basis. Hence, the quality of the data is outstanding. 
On the negative side, the selection of firms does not intend to be representative  
of the population, but rather depends on their voluntary cooperation with the Bank. This 
implies that some sectors are better represented than others. Particularly, the energy sector is 
very well covered, with a value-added coverage rate of over 70Ԝ%. Industry and market 
services – especially trade, postal services, transport and telecommunications – are quite well 
covered: reporting firms account for about 30Ԝ% of value added and about 20Ԝ% of total 
employment in industry, while the respective figures in the market service sector are 20Ԝ% and 
around 23Ԝ%. On the other hand, agriculture, mineral extraction and construction have a 
coverage rate of less than 10Ԝ%, both in terms of value added and employment.8 Another 
important source of bias is the larger-than-average size of reporting firms. In the industry 
sector, for example, about 50Ԝ% of firms in the sample had less than 250 employees, 
compared with more than 95Ԝ% in the population. Therefore one has to be cautious when 
extrapolating the results of our analysis. 
After editing the data,9 we selected those firms with at least three consecutive years 
of information. The result is an unbalanced panel covering the period 1991-201010 which 
contains information for 3,278 firms (26,543 observations in total). Table 1 shows the basic 
characteristics of the CBSO database.11 
2.2 The Technological Innovation Panel (PITEC) 
As stated in the introduction, a key part of our analysis is based on the fact that some firms 
might face credit constraints in financial markets, above all at times of distress. If that were 
the case, even if those firms found it optimal to increase investment in PEA during recessions 
due to its lower opportunity costs, they might not be able to do so because they have no 
                                                                          
7. The self-employed are not included. In 2007, about 50Ԝ% of the reporting firms were corporations and 45Ԝ% were 
limited liability companies. The rest were mainly cooperatives. 
8. Firms are classified under the different economic sectors according to their main activity. 
9. We drop observations with a negative value of capital stock and value added, as well as those with excessive 
changes in employment or investment. We also drop firms operating in the non-market economy, and those having 
experienced any type of restructuring, such as mergers and acquisitions. Lastly, we identify outliers (above or below p 99 
and p 1, respectively) and substitute their value by the corresponding threshold.   
10. The coverage of 2010, the last year of the database, is only partial with about 900 observations compared with 
1,300 or more observations for the other years. 
11. For more information on this database, please see López-García and Montero (2010).  
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access to the required external funds. One of the novelties of this paper is that we are able to 
exploit survey information from the Technological Innovation Panel (PITEC). PITEC is a 
longitudinal database constructed on the basis of the annual Spanish responses to the 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS) and is managed by the Spanish National Institute of 
Statistics (INE).12 The survey contains detailed information at the firm level on the inputs and 
outputs of the innovation process for a sample of about 10,000 Spanish firms. Although the 
panel started in 2003, we use it from 2004 to 2009 for reasons of comparability.13 
Although access to the database is public and free for researchers, observations are 
anonymised to preserve confidentiality. We had access, however, under a strict confidentiality 
agreement, to the fiscal identification numbers of a sample of firms so we could merge the 
PITEC information with the balance sheet information from the CBSO database. The merger 
was positive for about one-fifth of the observations – around 600 matched observations per 
year – in the CBSO database between 2004 and 2009.  
2.3 Constructing a proxy for financial obstacles to innovation 
The indicator of credit constraints is based on the direct answer provided by firms to the (very 
specific) PITEC question:   
“During the two previous years, how important was the lack of finance from sources 
outside your enterprise for hampering your innovation activities?”  
Firms have to rank the importance of this factor from 1 (high) to 3 (low).14 The 
procedure for constructing a credit constraint indicator for all firms in the CBSO sample (that is, 
not only for the matched firms) is inspired by the work of Coluzzi et al. (2008). It consists of two 
stages. In the first stage, we use an ordered probit model to estimate the relative importance of 
some firms’ characteristics in explaining the existence of financing obstacles. We perform this 
exercise for firms who responded to the PITEC questionnaire and had a positive matching in the 
CBSO database (a total of 946 firms). The set of explanatory variables includes those suggested 
by the literature, such as age, size, debt ratio, collateral, sector of activity, etc. In the second 
stage, we use the estimated coefficients of the first-stage preferred specification to compute, 
according to the value of the corresponding explanatory variables, the predicted probability of 
facing financial obstacles (that is, of responding that the importance of financial constraints for 
hampering innovation is high) of all firms in the CBSO database.  
Table 2 shows the percentage of those claiming to be financially constrained (in 
respect of carrying out innovative projects) according to size, age, sector of activity and some 
financial ratios.15 
                                                                          
12. PITEC is sponsored by Fundación Española para la Ciencia y la Tecnología (FECYT) and the COTEC  
Foundation and managed by the National Institute of Statistics. It can be reached at the following link: 
http://icono.fecyt.es/contenido.asp?dir=05)Publi/AA)panel  
13. In 2003 the sample contained about 73Ԝ% of firms with 200 or more employees and a sample of firms undertaking 
internal R&D expenditures in 2003. In 2004 the sample was enlarged to include firms with less than 200 employees and 
with external R&D activities, and a representative sample of small non-innovative firms (with less than 200 employees).  
14. There is a fourth possibility: “does not apply”. We decided that firms that responded “does not apply” and had 
positive R&D expenditure were not constrained, whereas those that gave the same response but did not perform R&D 
were not considered. 
15. We consider that a firm is financially constrained in Table 2 if it reports a lack of external finance as an important factor 
hampering innovation. If, on the other hand, the firm responds that the lack of finance is of medium or low importance, we 
consider it not to be financially constrained. The reason for this distinction is the fact that financial pressure has been proven 
to have a highly non-linear impact on business activity by the literature, and that it only becomes relevant when financial 
pressure exceeds a certain threshold (see, for example, Hernando and Martinez-Carrascal 2003).  
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On average, 23Ԝ% of firms think that the lack of external funds is seriously hampering 
their innovative activities (hence, they are financially constrained). If we draw a distinction by 
sector of activity, the highest proportion of constrained firms is found in the construction sector, 
and the lowest in manufacturing. Small firms (less than 50 employees) and very young firms (less 
than 10 years old) also seem to be  more financially constrained. Lastly, firms with a very low 
share of tangible assets (than can be collateralised), limited cash flow and those with high debt 
ratios and total debt burden seem to suffer as well from higher financing obstacles.  
These descriptive results confirm what we would expect from the literature on 
financial constraints, largely based on the seminal paper of Fazzari et al. (1988). The 
determinants of firms’ financial constraints identified by this literature are linked, in the first 
place, to the degree of opacity of the company from the point of view of the lender and 
include, most importantly, size and age (see, for example, Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1991 
and Coluzzi et al., 2008). There is a second group of determinants related to the financial 
vulnerability of the firm, such as the quantity and quality of collateral, debt ratio or  
financial burden (see, for example, Bernanke et al., 1996; Hernando and Martinez-Carrascal, 
2003; and Atanasova and Wilson, 2004). Lastly, there are a number of papers that stress that 
variables related to access to alternative sources of finance, such as being quoted in the 
stock market or belonging to a group, are also important (Harrison and McMillan, 2003).  
In the first stage of the analysis we rely on the PITEC survey data to analyse which of 
the firm’s characteristics suggested by the literature make it more likely for it to be financially 
constrained when it comes to investing in innovation. For that purpose, we assume that the 
firms’ underlying response can be described by the following specification: 
ܦ௜,௧כ ൌ ݔ௜,௧ߚ ൅ ߜ∆ݕ௧ ൅ ߤ௝ ൅ ߝ௜,௧             (1) 
ܦ௜,௧ ൌ 1 ݂݅ ܦ௜,௧כ ൑ ܿଵ
ܦ௜,௧ ൌ 2 ݂݅ ܿଵ ൏ ܦ௜,௧כ ൑ ܿଶ
ܦ௜,௧ ൌ 3 ݂݅ ܦ௜,௧כ ൐ ܿଶ
ቑ           (2) 
where ܦ௜,௧ is the answer (on a scale from 1 to 3) reported by firm i at time t to PITEC’s 
question on financing obstacles, ܦ௜,௧כ  represents a latent variable modeling the responses, ݔ௜,௧ 
is a vector of firms’ characteristics, and ߚ, ߜ, ܿଶ, ܿଵ refer to parameters and thresholds to be 
estimated. We include as well the growth rate of aggregate GDP (∆ݕ௧) to capture aggregate 
developments which could have an impact on the probability of firms accessing external 
finance and we control for industry-specific effects including a set of sector dummies (ߤ௝).16 
Standard errors will be consistent as long as the regression residuals are uncorrelated across 
both firms and years; since such uncorrelatedness is unlikely to hold in our case, we cluster 
the estimated standard errors. 
Given that the dependent variable is categorical and can take on 3 values, we use a 
pooled ordered probit model to estimate the model in (1) and (2). We have also tried, 
however, a probit model where the dependent variable takes the value of 1, if the firm 
responds that the lack of finance is important and 0 if it is not.17 As suggested by the 
                                                                          
16. We include dummies for manufacturing, construction and services and dummies for 10 more disaggregated  
sectors of activity: extraction, manufacturing, utilities, retail, hotels and restaurants, transport, postal services and 
telecommunications, real estate activities and other market services. 
17. We have also tried exploiting the panel structure of the PITEC database and run a random effects probit model with 
very similar results. 
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literature, we have included among the explanatory variables the firm’s age and size18 as well 
as a dummy if the firm is quoted in the stock market (=1 if quoted). We have also included 
four variables related to a firm’s financial vulnerability, all lagged one period: (1) the leverage 
ratio, defined as the ratio of interest-bearing external funds to internal funds; (2) cash-flow 
divided by the stock of capital at the beginning of the period; (3) total debt burden defined as 
the ratio of the cost of external funding to cash-flow; and (4) collateral, defined as the share of 
tangible assets over in total assets.19  
Table 3 reports the marginal effects from the estimation of the first-stage 
regressions. Columns [1] to [3] show the results with different measures of age and size, 3 
broad sectors of activity and the lagged debt ratio, total debt burden, cash-flow and 
collateral.20 Column [4] shows the results with 10 sectors of activity and column [5], our 
preferred specification, keeps only the significant variables.21 Lastly, column [6] repeats the 
analysis using a pooled probit model. Results are fairly robust and in accordance with what 
we could a priori expect from theory. Older firms have a lower probability of facing financial 
obstacles when it comes to innovation, while being small increases that probability by 14 pp. 
That very large impact of size is very similar to the one found in Coluzzi et al. (2008), in spite of 
the different databases used. Manufacturing and services firms have significantly less 
probabilities of facing credit constraints compared to firms operating in the construction 
sector and, among the variables reflecting the financial position of the firm, only the firm’s 
collateral turns out consistently not to be important. 
The next step is to use the estimated coefficients to impute a probability of facing 
credit constraints to innovation to all firms in our CBSO sample. All tables in the following 
sections present the results using the probability of facing financial obstacles estimated from 
the coefficients of column [5]. To check the robustness of the results, however, we have 
redone all the tables with the coefficients estimated using the alternative probit model.22 
The last row of Table 3 shows the percentage of firms that claimed to be financially 
constrained in PITEC and have been correctly imputed as such according to the estimated 
probabilities and, conversely, those that claimed not to be constrained and were predicted 
correctly. That percentage of correctly classified firms is above 70Ԝ% in all cases.   
 
                                                                          
18. We have tried different specifications. With respect to age, we have tried the log of the firm's age as well as a 
dummy that takes the value one if the firm is less than 10 years old and zero if it is not. With respect to size we have 
included the log of the number of employees and a dummy for small firms (less than 50 employees).   
19. We have also explored alternative specifications in this respect. Apart from including the lagged value of the financial 
ratios we have also tried with the deviation of the firm’s ratio with respect to the sector’s average that year and with a 
dummy that takes the value one if the firm’s ratio is above the sector’s median for that year.  For a detailed definition of 
the variables please refer to the Appendix. 
20. After many tries we found that the effect of a firm’s cash-flow was not linear. It made a significant difference on the 
probability of being credit constrained only when entered as a dummy taking the value one if the firm’s cash-flow is 
above the sector’s median. 
21. Note that the aggregate variable is not significant in any of the ordered probits. We tried with alternative variables 
such as the interest rates charged by banks to firms but it also turned out to be non-significant. 
22. Results did not change. In any case, they are available upon request. 
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3 The cyclicality of the R&D share and credit constraints 
3.1 Baseline specification 
In this section we estimate the cyclicality patterns of R&D investment across the Spanish  
firms in our sample, and how these patterns might differ in those firms that are more credit 
constrained. In particular, we conjecture that R&D investment should be more procyclical in 
firms facing tighter credit constraints. The rationale for this hypothesis is based on Aghion  
et al. (2010) who put forward a model in which firms can choose between short-run capital 
investment and long-term R&D investment. Moreover, innovation requires that firms survive 
short-run liquidity shocks which might be absorbed by the firms relying on either short-run 
earnings or borrowing. Whenever the firm is hit by a bad shock, its current earnings are 
reduced and, therefore, so is the firm’s ability to borrow in order to innovate. This implies that 
a negative shock should hit R&D investment more in firms that are more credit constrained. 
On the other hand, our main interest is on how R&D investment decisions are 
affected by cyclical shocks and credit constraints in relative terms to other capital investment 
decisions. For instance, a firm hit by a negative shock might reduce both R&D and physical 
capital investment; however, as long as the reduction in physical capital in larger in absolute 
terms than the reduction in R&D investment, the share of R&D over total investment would 
increase providing evidence in favor of the opportunity cost theory. Hence we focus on the 
share of R&D investment over total investment as our variable of interest. 
All in all, in order to test the theoretical predictions just described, we follow Aghion 
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  (3) 
where RDit represents R&D investment, Iit physical investment, CCit-1 the probability that firms 
are credit constrained, and sit the (log) variation in firms’ real sales. We also account for 
industry dummies (j) and firms’ fixed effects (i), while uit represents the usual error term.23 
CCit-1 is estimated as explained in Section 2, while the other variables come from the 
CBSO database. RDit is proxied by R&D expenditures; whereas Iit is approximated by gross 
fixed physical capital formation and sit is the firm’s real sales, deflated with the value added 
deflator at a sectoral level (see Table A1 in the Appendix for a description of all the variables). 
As explained above, we expect the share of R&D investment to be countercyclical  
in the absence of credit constraints, in line with the opportunity-cost approach, which implies 
that 1<0 and ii<0 (i=1,2,3). However, since financial constraints are supposed to reverse 
the cyclicality of investment composition, they should lead to a more procyclical R&D share, 
i.e., 1>0 and ii>0 (i=1,2,3).  
                                                                          
23. We include 25 sector dummies, see Appendix. In any case, results without sector dummies are virtually the same 
since their effects should already be captured by the firm dummies. 
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Finally, we do not expect a particular sign for 0. On the one hand, a firm may 
reduce its demand for short-run productive investment when it is financially constrained  
(as shown, for instance, by Benito and Hernando, 2002, for the case of Spanish firms); 
however, long-run productivity-enhancing investments should also be affected negatively 
by credit supply (as shown by, inter alia, Hall’s (2002) survey, and López-García and 
Montero (2010) for Spanish firms). Thus, depending on the relative strength of these two 
effects, 0 may be either positive or negative. 
As regards the estimation method, we first consider the Within Groups (WG) 
estimator given that we find it appealing to allow correlation of the unobserved firm 
heterogeneity (i) with the independent variables. Second, in order to alleviate potential 
simultaneity biases arising from the joint determination of sales and both types of 
investment, we use an instrumental variables approach, the first-differenced GMM 
estimator discussed in Arellano and Bond (1991). This technique is based on taking first 
differences of the variables to eliminate the time-invariant effects and then on using lagged 
levels of the regressors as instruments for their first-differences. In particular, we assume 
that both sales and credit constraints are predetermined with respect to the R&D 
investment share so that instruments lagged t-1 and earlier are assumed (and tested) to be 
valid. The use of “internal instruments” makes this approach particularly attractive in our 
setting, where it is difficult to find appropriate external instrumental variables. Finally, note 
that the predeterminedness assumption made for estimation implies that current shocks to 
investment decisions made by the firm do have an effect of future sales and credit 
constraints which seems sensible at the frequency of yearly data considered here. 
Table 4 reports the results from estimating equation (3), both using the GMM and 
WG estimators. The first results that are worth highlighting show that the share of R&D 
investment is indeed countercyclical. The coefficient estimates for the variation in current 
sales are negative and statistically significant at conventional levels, which is robust to the use 
of the GMM estimator and to the inclusion of additional regressors. The coefficients for the 
first and second lags of the change in sales are also correctly signed and have a statistical 
significance robust to the estimation method. As regards the economic relevance, a 10Ԝ% 
change in current sales would induce a reduction in the share of R&D of between 0.1 
percentage points (pp) and 0.8 pp that same year. Moreover, if we take into account the 
results under column [9], that effect would be quite persistent and in the order of 1.9 pp 
accumulated by t-2. This magnitude is quite important, since it implies a 26Ԝ% cut in the 
average R&D share.24 
When we introduce CCit-1 as an additional regressor, the countercyclicality of the 
share of R&D does not change (columns [4]-[9]). This variable alone shows no significant 
impact on the R&D share in any of the specifications. This would provide some evidence that 
R&D spending tends to be affected as much by credit constraints as by physical investment. 
However, when CCit-1 is interacted with the sales shock variables, we obtained results 
consistent with the theoretical predictions (positive and statistically significant coefficients)  
i.e. the share of R&D turns less countercyclical in the presence of financial constraints, a result 
that is robust for all the variation in sales considered (in t, t-1 and t-2). Indeed, for those firms 
                                                                          
24. It should be noted that the distribution of the R&D share is highly skewed (the median share and the 75Ԝ% percentile are 
0Ԝ%). If we were to take as a reference the 80Ԝ% percentile, the reduction in the R&D share would amount to close to 83Ԝ%.  
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where CCit-1 → 1, the sensitivity to real sales growth would be ii+ii > 0, in other words, 
the R&D share would be procyclical.25 
3.2 Robustness checks 
In order to check the robustness of our results, we have carried out a set of additional 
empirical exercises, a selection of which is presented below. First, we have studied 
whether using an alternative definition of the R&D share changes the results. Second, we 
comment on some other empirical exercises that we do not report. And thirdly, we check 
whether the countercyclicality of the R&D share is determined by the behaviour of the 
level of physical investment.  
Table 5 reports the results from estimating equation (3) using different normalisations 
of R&D spending. To be more specific, we have used as dependent variables the ratio of R&D 
expenditures to i) gross value added (GVA); ii) total employees (in real terms); iii) gross 
operating surplus (GOS); and iv) the ratio of R&D employees to total employees. In one way or 
another, all these ratios reflect a trade-off between a PEA and a productive activity. The ratio 
to GVA would account for the trade-off between producing today (i.e. generating value added 
today) and improving production tomorrow (through PEAs such as R&D). The ratio of R&D to 
GOS would change the focus to profitability: either you generate profits today, or you invest  
to enhance your profits tomorrow. Finally, the ratio of R&D employees to total employment is 
a real measure proxying for how labour resources are distributed within the firm.  
As Table 5 shows, all these dependent variables convey the same message, that is, 
no matter how you measure the R&D share it turns out to be countercyclical, since the 
coefficient of the variation of sales is negative and tends to be statistically significant across 
specifications. Moreover, the share of R&D investment becomes less countercyclical in the 
presence of credit constraints, as the parameter for the interaction term (sit ∙ CCit-1) is 
positive and significant. 
Additionally, we have checked the robustness of these results to the definition of the 
variable proxying for the cycle. To this end, we have substituted firms’ sales by firms’ GVA 
and output (both measured at basic prices and deflated with the sectoral value added 
deflator). Results in Table 4 turned out to be qualitatively similar. Moreover, we have used 
other measures of credit constraints derived from the same framework described in Section 2 
(using results from columns [1]-[4] and [6] in Table 3). Again, results in Table 4 would be 
qualitatively similar.26  
Finally, as the denominator of the R&D share (i.e. R&D spending + physical 
investment) is not constant over the firm’s business cycle, our baseline results do not provide 
direct information on how the average level of R&D investment is affected by both the  
cycle and credit constraints. For instance, a countercyclical R&D share would be consistent 
with the level of R&D either decreasing or increasing, if it turned out that the level of physical 
investment decreases sufficiently during slumps. 
                                                                          
25. The p-value for the test of the null hypothesis that ii+ii > 0 in column [6] is 0.14, so we cannot reject that for 
those firms with CCit-1 → 1 the R&D share is procyclical. 
26. For the sake of brevity, we do not report these results, but they are available upon request. We have also estimated 
a specification for only the firms included in PITEC and using as a proxy for credit constraints the direct answer to the 
question of lack of external finance, but, unfortunately, estimation results were less robust than in our baseline 
specification. Although we tended to find that the coefficient on sales growth was negative and statistically significant, 
the interaction of sales with the direct measure of financial obstacles was sometimes positive and other negative, and 
rarely significant. These results are also available upon request. 
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One way to solve this ambiguity is to estimate the following specification for the level 































            
(4) 
where Iit is physical investment, Kit-1 denotes the stock of physical capital and the other 
variables are defined as in equation (3). This equation would be similar in spirit to those that 
test for the presence of financial constraints.27 In line with this literature, we expect physical 
investment to be procyclical (1,2>0) and negatively affected by credit constraints (0<0), 
while the interaction of such constraints with the sales shocks should be positive (1,2>0), as 
financial constraints – procyclical per se – should strengthen the procyclicallity of physical 
investment. Again, we estimate this equation with the WG and GMM estimators. 
Table 6 shows the results from estimating equation (4). As can be seen, physical 
investment turns out to be procyclical, with both parameters on the variation of sales being 
positive and highly statistically significant (see columns [1], [2], [4] and [5]). However, when we 
introduce our proxy for financial constraints, that significance is lost. Moreover, and contrary 
to previous literature, the proxy for credit constraints is not statistically significant, either alone 
or when interacted with the variation in sales.28 This could be the result of the way the 
indicator of credit constraints has been built, given it is based on firms' responses about 
obstacles to innovation.29 Yet, since we want to show that the results in Table 4 concerning 
the interactions sit-k∙CCit-1 (k=0,1,2) are not driven by the dynamics of physical investment, 
we must stick to this indicator in order to be consistent. 
In sum, our results point to a countercyclical share of R&D and a procyclical level of 
physical investment. What does this imply for the behaviour of the level of R&D expenditures? 
Let us assume that we are in a recession; therefore, the countercyclicality of the R&D share 
means that this ratio would be increasing. However, given that the level of physical investment 
is procyclical, this would be consistent with R&D either increasing or decreasing (although to 
a lesser extent than physical investment). Regression results reported in Table 5 show that 
indeed the level of R&D investment – normalised using several denominators, such as the 
GVA, the GOS or R&D employees – would be countercyclical. Thus, our results suggest that 
when Spanish firms are facing a downturn, they tend to adjust productive investments and to 
either preserve or increase R&D, which would be consistent with the view espoused by the 
opportunity-cost approach.  
3.3 Heterogeneous effects 
In a recent paper, Cincera et al. (2011) investigate the adjustments in corporate R&D  
and innovation strategies during the current economic crisis. More specifically, the paper 
provides evidence that adjustments in R&D investments are less pronounced in firms with 
higher levels of R&D intensity. This raises the question whether our findings also hold for 
different types of firms regarding R&D intensity levels. Cincera et al. (2011) also explore 
the effects of firms' age on their R&D investment decisions. They find that R&D 
                                                                          
27. See the pioneering work of Fazzari et al. (1988) and the subsequent literature that developed afterwards. 
28. This result also holds when we do not include the lag of physical investment –which is not per se significant. 
29. Indeed, in Aghion et al. (2007) their proxy for credit constraints – based on the firms' credit history – turns out to be 
negative and significant, while the interactions are not, which means that physical investment is negatively affected by 
financial constraints irrespective of the firm’s position in the business cycle. 
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adjustments do not seem to depend on firms' age. We investigate this issue further by 
considering heterogeneous effects for high-growth firms. According to common 
definitions in the literature, high-growth firms are typically young firms succeeding at the 
beginning of their activity. Thus, our conjecture is that firms' performance as they take 
their first steps might be relevant for their R&D investments as opposed to firms' age as 
discussed in Cincera et al. (2011). 
As suggested by the opportunity-cost theory, the hypothesis we maintain throughout 
the paper is that R&D investment as a share of total investment is countercyclical. However, 
we argue and provide evidence that this share of R&D investment might become pro-cyclical 
at sufficiently high levels of credit constraints. In this section we investigate the existence  
of heterogeneous effects regarding the cyclicality of R&D investment decisions and the role of 
credit constraints in such decisions. More concretely we consider three different types  
of firms for which this behaviour might differ, namely, high-technology firms, new innovative 
firms, and high-growth firms. 
We classify as high-technology firms those companies belonging to the high-tech 
sector according to the Spanish National Classification of Economic Activities (CNAE 93). On 
the other hand, new innovative firms are those with zero R&D investment during the previous 
year and positive R&D in the current one. Finally, we label as high-growth firms those with 
more than ten workers and with over 20Ԝ% growth for two or more consecutive years in the 
number of workers. 
Our econometric test of the existence of heterogeneous effects is based on the 
inclusion of interaction terms in our baseline specification in equation (3). We first construct 
three dummy variables, one for each category of firm (i.e. high-technology, new innovative, 
high-growth). Then we interact each dummy with the change in sales (ΔSalest x Dt), and with 
the interaction of change in sales and our proxy for credit constraints (ΔSalest x CCt-1 x Dt).  
If the first interaction (ΔSalest x Dt) is significantly different from zero, the cyclicality of R&D 
investments differs across different types of firms. If the second interaction term (ΔSalest x 
CCt-1 x Dt) emerges as being statistically significant, we can conclude that credit constraints 
exert a different effect on the investment decisions of R&D investments across the firm 
categories we consider. 
Table 7 presents the results including the interaction terms in our baseline 
specification. In particular, columns [1] and [2] refer to high-technology firms, in columns [3] 
and [4] we consider new innovative firms and columns [5] and [6] include the results of 
high-growth firms. In all three cases, there is no evidence of heterogeneous effects of credit 
constraints on R&D investment decisions. This is the case because the interaction term 
ΔSalest x CCt-1 x Dt is not statistically different from zero in columns [2], [4] and [6]. We thus 
conclude that previous R&D intensity and/or performance do not seem to affect the 
influence of credit constraints when firms determine the share of their investments 
earmarked for R&D activities. 
In contrast, according to the estimates in column [1], R&D investments in high-
technology firms are more countercyclical than in the other firms (the interaction coefficient is 
negative and significant). Since R&D is expected to be part of the core business in high-
technology firms, it seems reasonable that these firms try to take more advantage of the 
lower opportunity cost of R&D during crises as suggested by the opportunity-cost theory. 
This result also holds for new innovative firms in column [3], which means that for those firms 
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deciding to start their R&D activity, economic crises are more costly in terms of R&D. In 
contrast, firms with positive R&D investment in the previous period seem to have less 
pronounced adjustments in R&D in the downturn of the business cycle. This finding suggests 
that cyclical movements in R&D investment are more pronounced in the intensive margin 
rather than in the extensive margin. Finally, the cyclical behaviour of high-growth firms does 
not differ from the behaviour in other firms (the interaction is not significantly different from 
zero in column [5]). 
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4 Other intangible investment 
At the firm level we have found that the share of R&D expenditures in total investment is 
countercyclical as suggested by the opportunity-cost theory, although only in the absence of 
“acute” credit constraints. In this section we estimate the cyclicality of other intangible / 
productivity-enhancing investments in order to test whether reallocation effects of recessions 
play any role beyond R&D. We also check whether the presence of credit constraints affects 
the cyclical behaviour of these other intangible assets. 
Despite the prominent role of R&D in the group of productivity-enhancing 
investments, there are other components of the stock of intangible capital which could be 
important for long-term productivity growth. In particular, López-Garcia and Montero (2010) 
show that investment in human capital is a significant determinant of firms’ innovative activity. 
Bean (1990) and Galí and Hammour (1993) author two of the few papers looking at the effect 
of cycles on human capital accumulation and find that, according to the opportunity-cost 
theory, firms might also shift resources to building human capital through job training of labour 
hoarded during recessions.   
Following Aghion et al. (2007), the specification considered is the same as in the 
previous section. We first regress the variable of interest on a proxy for the business cycle at 
the firm level (change in sales) in order to estimate the raw cyclicality of the dependent 
variable. Then, we add an interaction of the cycle with our proxy for credit constraints faced 
by the firm in order to check the role of the latter on the cyclicality of the dependent variable. 
Table 8a presents the results of estimating the cyclicality of training expenditures.  
In particular, we consider the ratio of training expenditures30 to training expenditures plus  
total investment as the dependent variable to be consistent with the previous section. Overall, 
we find that, on the one hand, training expenditures are countercyclical, as expected from 
theory and, on the other hand, credit constraints do not seem to play any role in human 
capital formation within the firm.   
More concretely, in columns [1], [2], [5] and [6] of Table 8a we estimate a negative 
and statistically significant effect from the cycle on training expenditures. This basically 
indicates that firms devote a larger share of their investment resources to human capital 
accumulation during recessions. This result confirms the findings in Galí and Hammour (1993) 
using a VAR approach at the aggregate level, and also provides evidence in favour of the 
opportunity-cost theory.   
The magnitude of the estimated effects is also economically significant. In particular, 
a 10Ԝ% decrease (increase) in current sales induces an increase (decrease) in the share of 
training expenditures in total investment of around 0.1 pp during the current period and  
of about 0.2 pp built up during the following year. This effect represents 6.3Ԝ% of the average 
training expenditure share in our sample. 
Columns [3], [4], [7] and [8] in Table 8a provide evidence that credit constraints do 
not seem to play any role in human capital investments for hoarded labour within the firm. In 
                                                                          
30. As we have information on training spending from 1991 to 2007, we will use a shorter sample to carry out the 
analysis of that variable. 
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particular, we observe that neither the credit constraints proxy nor their interactions with the 
cycle are significantly different from zero. This result suggests that firms are able to shift 
resources to invest relatively more in on-the-job training during recessions. As suggested by 
Nickell et al. (1995), the rationale of this finding might be that investment in human capital  
is relatively more expensive in terms of time, but not in terms of money, so credit constraints 
are not a significant determinant of this type of investment.  
All in all, these results seem to support the opportunity-cost theory: during 
recessions firms invest a relatively larger source of their resources in personnel training given 
the lower forgone cost of this PEA and, contrary to R&D investment, this process is not 
hampered by the presence of credit constraints. 
Aside from R&D and training, there are other investments in intangibles which 
could enhance firms’ productivity performance in the future. In 2000, the accounting rules 
changed in Spain and obliged firms to record under different balance sheet entries 
investment in R&D and IT applications31 and other intangible investments “not produced” 
within the firm, which include mostly the purchase of the right to use and exploit external 
inventions i.e. patents purchase. This distinction, which can only be made for the period 
2001-2010, between “in-house” R&D and purchase of external R&D might be of interest 
given that firms might buy patents when credit constraints prevent their own innovation 
activity, since the former are less expensive than the latter. This would indicate that firms 
facing liquidity problems might substitute their own R&D activity by purchasing innovation 
carried out by others (i.e. patent acquisition).  
Table 8b reports the results from estimating our baseline equation distinguishing 
between investment in R&D and IT, on the one hand, and the purchase of patents, on the 
other. Columns [1] to [4] present the estimates from considering the ratio of investment in 
R&D and software applications to total investment. The results are consistent with those 
presented in Table 4, the ratio is countercyclical as expected, but becomes procyclical 
beyond a certain level of credit constraints. This reinforces the robustness of the results of 
Section 3, which were based on expenditures data instead of the narrow definition used here. 
Moreover, adding data on investments in software applications does not seem to change the 
cyclicality pattern of investment in R&D. 
Columns [5]-[8] of Table 8b repeat the estimation of our baseline specification, but 
now considering the share of investment in patent rights in total investment as a dependent 
variable. The cyclical behaviour of these intangible investments is different from that of other 
intangibles, as it seems to be unrelated to the business cycle, i.e. acyclical. Despite the 
coefficients on sales being generally negative, they are not statistically significant in all cases. 
On the other hand, credit constraints do not play any role in this type of intangible 
investments, suggesting that firms decide the share of investment in patent acquisition 
regardless of sales volume and, in general, access to credit does not represent an obstacle 
for such investments. This distinct effect of the cycle on the decisions to invest in R&D or in 
patents could be uncovering some type of substitution between both types of investment at 
times of distress. Given the novelty of this finding, we take a closer look at the 
complementarity/substitutability of factors of production in the next section. 
                                                                          
31. Note here that the distinction between different intangible assets is only available with information on R&D investment 
rather than R&D spending as considered in previous sections. According to CBSO data, while R&D spending 
encompasses any kind of R&D-related expenditure, R&D investment only includes those expenditures devoted to R&D 
projects expected to somehow succeed in the future. 
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5 Complementarities between R&D capital and other factors of production  
5.1 R&D capital versus physical capital and labour 
Although the overall benefits from R&D investment are widely accepted, how to efficiently 
promote such investment remains a challenge for policy makers. In previous sections we 
found some evidence in favour of the hypothesis that credit constraints are an important 
obstacle for R&D investment during downturns. An additional issue in this respect is the 
possible complementarities between R&D and the other factors of production, namely, 
physical capital and labour, and their potential indirect effects on aggregate productivity. The 
usual view that factors of production are substitutes is based on traditional mass production 
systems in which capital and unskilled labour are typically substitutes for each other; however, 
modern production technologies usually require that machinery, knowledge capital, and 
human capital are combined in a complementary fashion. 
In the definition by Edgeworth,32 two inputs are complements if an increase in the 
level of one input raises the marginal value of another input. That is, factors that are 
complementary tend to appear together: more of one factor is optimally accompanied by 
more of the other. This definition implies that if the relative price of R&D declines, firms will 
increase investment not only in R&D, but also in other complementary inputs. Therefore, if 
there are complementarities between R&D and labour, the aggregate cost of under-
investment in R&D during downturns due to credit constraints might be exacerbated by  
an induced under-investment in labour, especially skilled labour, as an additional and 
complementary PEA. Thus, this would have an additional indirect effect on long-term growth, 
via less human capital accumulation. 
In order to further investigate this issue, we estimate output and substitution 
elasticities based on a production function approach at the firm level. Briefly anticipating  
our findings, while some complementarities exist between R&D expenditures and labour, our 
empirical results seem to indicate that physical and R&D capital are substitute inputs. These 
findings lead us to the conclusion that the overall cost of R&D under-investment during 
downturns due to credit constraints might probably be exacerbated by a resulting under-
investment in labour. 
Despite the indisputable appeal of the popular Cobb-Douglas production function, it 
is not suitable for our purpose here since it constrains the substitution elasticities between 
different inputs to unity. Therefore, our methodological framework departs from a Translog 
production function (Christensen et al., 1973) at the firm level as follows: 
ln൫ܸܣ௜௝௧൯ ൌ ߙ௄ ln ܭ௜௝௧ ൅ ߙ௅ ln ܮ௜௝௧ ൅ ߙ஼ ln ܥ௜௝௧ ൅ ߚ௄௄൫ln K௜௝௧൯ଶ ൅ ߚ௅௅൫ln L௜௝௧൯ଶ ൅
ߚ஼஼൫ln C௜௝௧൯ଶ ൅ ߚ௄௅ ln ܭ௜௝௧ ln ܮ௜௝௧ ൅ ߚ௄஼ ln ܭ௜௝௧ ln ܥ௜௝௧ ൅ ߚ஼௅ ln ܥ௜௝௧ ln ܮ௜௝௧ ൅ ߜ௧ ൅ ߤ௝ ൅ ݒ௜௝௧  
         (5) 
where ܸܣ௜௝௧ refers to the Value Added in constant euro of firm ݅ belonging to sector ݆ in year 
ݐ. ܭ௜௝௧, ܮ௜௝௧, and ܥ௜௝௧ refer to the factors of production, physical capital, labour, and R&D 
capital respectively. On the other hand, ߜ௧ and ߤ௝ include a set of time and sector dummies 
respectively. While the time dummies aim to capture the common factors affecting all firms in 
                                                                          
32. See Hicks (1970) for an overview. 
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a given year, the sector dummies control for systematic differences in production 
technologies across industries. Note that the Cobb-Douglas production function is a special 
case of the Translog where all the coefficients of the quadratic terms are set equal to zero.33 
For production functions with more than two inputs, the most common measure of 
substitutability / complementarity is the Allen partial elasticity of substitution (see Allen and 
Hicks, 1934). This elasticity is defined as the percentage change in the ratio of the quantity of 
two factors to the percentage change in their price ratio allowing all other factors to adjust to 
their optimal level. While cost functions are the usual approach for estimating such elasticity, 
data on factor prices and total costs are generally not available at the firm level. Therefore, as 
suggested by Dewan and Min (1997), we estimate the substitution elasticities considering 
production functions. In the framework of a three input production function, the Allen  
partial elasticity of substitution (AES) for two inputs (R&D, denoted by ܥ, and physical capital, 
denoted by ܭ) is given by: 
 
ߪ௄஼ ൌ ௄൉௙಼ା௅൉௙ಽା஼൉௙಴௄൉஼ ൉
ୢୣ୲ ሺு಼಴ሻ
ୢୣ୲ ሺுሻ                                                (6) 
 
where ௄݂ ൌ ߲ܸܣ ߲ܭ⁄  is the marginal product of physical capital, det ሺܪሻ is the bordered 
Hessian determinant of the ܪ matrix: 
ܪ ൌ ൮
0 ௄݂ ௅݂ ஼݂
௄݂ ௄݂௄ ௄݂௅ ௄݂஼
௅݂ ௅݂௄ ௅݂௅ ௅݂஼
஼݂ ஼݂௄ ஼݂௅ ஼݂஼
൲                                                (7) 
 
with ௄݂஼ ൌ ߲ଶܸܣ ߲ܭ߲ܥ⁄  and ܪ௄஼ is the cofactor of the ܪ matrix associated with ௄݂஼. The 
other partial elasticities of substitution (i.e. σKL, σCL), as well as partial elasticities with more 
than three inputs, are defined analogously. 
If the AES is approximately equal to 1, then two goods are "normal" substitutes. 
Intuitively, the ratio of the factor quantities adjusts exactly in proportion to changes in their 
relative prices. If the AES is zero, the prices of the two factors have no influence on their ratio, 
while negative numbers indicate two factors are complements. 
Both Cobb Douglas and Translog production functions together with the resulting 
elasticities are estimated considering Value Added as the output and three inputs, R&D 
capital, physical capital and labour. R&D capital is constructed from the R&D expenditures 
variable considered in Section 3 using the perpetual inventory method with a depreciation  
rate of 15Ԝ% typically considered in the literature (see Beneito, 2001).34 The labour input is 
measured as the number of employees minus the employees devoted to R&D activities. By 
                                                                          
33. For the sake of comparability we will also present the estimates from the Cobb Douglas production function. In addition 
to the Translog, other production function specifications with unrestricted substitution elasticities between inputs are 
available in the literature (e.g. the CES-Translog proposed by Pollak et al., 1984). In this study we opt for the Ttranslog 
specification because it does not require non-linear estimation techniques (with the subsequent problems of local minima 
and convergence that seems to be specially relevant in our sample) and, more importantly, because the alternative CES-
Translog imposes severe constraints that usually result in substitution elasticities close to 1 (see Hitt and Snir, 1999). 
34. The initial stock is taken from the CBSO dataset, and it is measured by intangible capital based on R&D and IT (see 
Appendix for more details). 
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proceeding in this manner, we aim to avoid double counting of R&D investments as far as 
possible.35 Finally, physical capital is also taken from the CBSO. 
In addition to OLS, we consider an IV approach to address the potential endogeneity 
of the inputs with respect to output, and thus check the robustness of our findings to this 
issue. In particular, in the spirit of Arellano and Bond (1991), lagged levels of the inputs are 
used as instruments with the hope that current shocks to output are uncorrelated with past 
decisions on the input mix at the firm level. It should be noted here that the specifications  
in Table 11 do not include firm-specific effects in the production function. It is usual in the 
literature that estimates of R&D productivity based on within firm variation are typically small 
and statistically insignificant. This occurs because, as emphasised in Hall and Mairesse 
(1995), within estimates (based on either within groups or first differenced approaches) of 
R&D productivities might be biased due to systematical differences in the potential profitability 
of R&D in particular industries (e.g. electronics vs. agriculture) that cannot be captured 
through within firm variation in the data. Therefore, Hall and Mairesse (1995) argue that if the 
focus is on the economy-wide productivity gains that might be induced by R&D, estimates 
based on between firm-variation in R&D are more appropriate.36 
Columns [1]-[2] and [5]-[6] of Table 9 present the elasticities resulting from the 
estimation of the two production functions (i.e. Cobb Douglas and Translog). The estimated 
R&D – output elasticity (ηC) of 3Ԝ%-4Ԝ% is in line with previous studies (e.g. Hall and Mairesse, 
1995 for France, and Hall and Mairesse, 1996 for the US). Physical capital – output (ηK) and 
labour – output (ηL) elasticities are also comparable to previous work on firm level production 
functions (e.g. Blundell and Bond, 2000; Lichtenberg, 1995). Moreover, the second order 
terms in the Translog specification in columns [5] and [6] are jointly different from zero giving 
support to this functional form for estimating substitution elasticities. In particular, the F-test 
values are 48.35 and 40.34, respectively, with both p-values below 0.001. 
Turning to Allen substitution elasticities in columns [5] and [6], we find that physical 
capital and R&D capital are substitutes (σCK ൐ 0) while labour acts as a complement of both 
physical and R&D capital (σKL ൏ 0, σCL ൏ 0 ). Since the equations for the AES are non-linear 
functions of the estimated parameters as well as the quantities of factor inputs, we 
approximate the means and standard errors of the elasticity estimates using Monte Carlo 
simulations. In particular, the numbers reported in Table 9 are based on 1,000,000 random 
draws from a multivariate normal distribution, i.e., the asymptotic distribution of our parameter 
estimates.37 Moreover, we follow earlier literature (Berndt and Wood, 1979) and evaluate the 
elasticities at the median values of the inputs. 
Since the seminal paper by Griliches (1969), the complementarity between physical 
capital and skilled labour (σKL ൏ 0) has received empirical support (see, for example, Duffy  
et al., 2004). The underlying idea is that as countries develop, labour becomes more skilled 
and changes from being substitutable by capital to being highly complementary. Following the 
same argument, labour should also be complementary to R&D capital as we observe in our 
data (σCL ൏ 0). In fact, Nelson and Phelps (1966) already studied complementarity between 
R&D and investments in human capital. Under their approach, labour is not simply another 
                                                                          
35. Physical capital might also include R&D-related investments, meaning that the overall R&D elasticity would be 
ߟ஼כ ൌ ߟ஼ ൅ ߣߟ௄, where ߣ is the share of R&D-related capital in the overall physical capital stock. If this share is low 
enough, our naive estimate ߟ஼ would be close to the overall R&D elasticity. 
36. In any event, our findings hold qualitatively when including firm effects. 
37. Following Dewan and Min (1997) we discard random draws leading to elasticities outside the ±10 range. 
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factor of production, because it facilitates technology adoption and diffusion. As a result of 
R&D-labour complementarities, credit constraints during downturns might also be playing a 
role in labour investments by Spanish firms. According to the results in previous sections and 
the opportunity-cost theory, in the absence of credit constraints firms would invest in R&D 
during recessions since the opportunity costs of such investments is lower than during 
expansions. Moreover, higher R&D investments would also be accompanied by higher labour 
investments, as both inputs seem to enter as complements in the production function. 
Therefore, credit constraints might be hampering not only investment in R&D but also in 
labour, as discussed in previous sections. On the other hand, our finding that R&D capital is a 
net substitute of physical capital (σCK ൐ 0) concur with the existing literature on capital-labour 
substitution (see Berndt, 1991 for an overview).  
5.2 R&D and investment in other intangibles 
In columns [3]-[4] and [7]-[8] of Table 9 we consider four inputs in the production function 
instead of three. In particular, we consider a broader measure of intangible capital from the 
CBSO and split this capital into two different categories. On the one hand, Cଵ refers to 
intangible capital based on innovation produced within the firm, including R&D as well as IT 
capital; on the other hand, Cଶ refers to intangible capital resulting from innovation activities 
produced outside the firm i.e. patent acquisitions. 
While output elasticities of physical capital and labour remain virtually unchanged 
with respect to the specification with three inputs, the overall elasticity of intangible capital 
(ηCଵ ൅ ηCଶ) is around 4-5Ԝ%, slightly higher than R&D capital, as expected, since intangible 
capital includes R&D as a component. Partial substitution elasticities confirm the results 
previously discussed, labour enters as a complement of both types of intangible capital in the 
production process (σCଵL ൏ 0, σCଶL ൏ 0). This indicates that irrespective of the source of 
innovation activities, be it inside or outside the firm, the activities should be accompanied by 
labour investments, so that under-investment in innovation might additionally generate under-
investments in labour. Substitutability of physical and intangible capital appears to be 
confirmed for both types of intangible capital (σCଵK ൐ 0, σCଶK ൐ 0), especially for non-
produced intangible capital. Finally, although not statistically significant, the Allen partial 
substitution elasticities for both intangible capital stocks point to substitution effects; firms 
decide whether to innovate by themselves or by acquiring innovation in the market (via patent 
acquisitions), as was suggested by the results of the previous section. 
All in all, we would like to emphasise at this point that these results should be 
interpreted with caution as we are aware of the limitations of the approach considered in this 
section. In particular, substitution elasticities might easily be heterogeneous across industries 
or even across firms. Here we estimate homogeneous firm-level elasticities with the aim of 
providing some heuristic evidence of potential negative spillover effects of under-investment in 
innovation due to credit constraints through the channel of human capital accumulation. 
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6 Conclusions 
We have used a Spanish firm-level panel data set over the period 1991-2010 to study the 
relationship between credit constraints and some firms’ PEA over the business cycle. Among 
these activities, the focus of our paper has been on the main driver of innovation i.e. R&D 
investment, as well as on other measurable proxies of these activities, such as firms’ training 
expenditures, and investment in other types of intangible assets.  
A first step in our analysis has been to build a direct indicator of credit constraints. In 
order to do this, we matched two sources of firm-level information, namely, data for innovative 
firms in the Technological Innovation Panel (PITEC) from the National Institute of Statistics and 
data for non-financial corporations from the Banco de España's CBSO. This allowed us to 
estimate a probability of being credit constrained which is relevant for firms’ R&D decisions, 
since we used the responses to a question in PITEC directly addressing this issue. 
Our main results can be summarised as follows: i) the share of R&D spending in total 
investment is countercyclical without credit constraints, but this cyclical behaviour could be 
reversed as firms face tighter financial constraints; ii) the cyclical behaviour of a proxy for human 
capital accumulation – firms’ spending on training – resembles that of the R&D share in the 
sense of being countercyclical, although it does not seem to be affected by our measure of 
credit constraints; iii) when we look at the levels of both physical and R&D investment, the 
former turns out to be highly procyclical, while the latter tends to be countercyclical; iv) these 
results hold when we use an alternative measure of R&D investment that only includes  
the portions of expenditures more likely to yield profits in the future and that also takes into 
account investment in software applications; v) a measure of other non-produced (within the  
firm) intangibles which is dominated by the behaviour of the purchases of patents (but which 
also includes other intangibles such as franchises and licenses), seem to be unrelated to the 
business cycle (in other words, acyclical) and not affected by credit constraints.  
Finally, we draw attention to an issue that has been somehow neglected by the 
literature on the cyclical properties of R&D, which is the potential existence of indirect effects 
of business cycles on long-run growth stemming from the pattern of complementarities and 
substitutabilities among the different productive factors. Our findings show that R&D capital 
and labour are complementary, while R&D capital and physical capital seem to be substitute 
inputs. These results suggest that the overall cost to long-term growth of R&D under-
investment during downturns due to the presence of credit constraints might probably be 
exacerbated by a resulting under-investment in human capital – although, as we have seen 
above, the share of training expenditures tends to behave countercyclically irrespective of the 
existence of financial constraints, which would mitigate this indirect effect.  
As regards policy implications, countercyclical macroeconomic policies should 
provide support for R&D activities and productivity growth in firms that are more credit 
constrained and more dependent on external finance. However, this would not be the case 
for the other firms.  
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% stock market 6.1%
Source: Banco de España.
% innovating
Minimum of consecutive obs. per firm




Period average, % of constrained firms Matched sample: 2004-2009
Overall 23%










< 10 years old 27%
Between 10 and 19 years old 25%
More than 20 years old 20%
By debt ratio
Lower than p10 (by sector and year) 11%
Higher than p90 (by sector and year) 24%
By total debt burden
Lower than p10 (by sector and year) 13%
Higher than p90 (by sector and year) 24%
By cashflow
Lower than p10 (by sector and year) 32%
Higher than p90 (by sector and year) 20%
By collateral
Lower than p10 (by sector and year) 26%
Higher than p90 (by sector and year) 17%
































                 
Table 3. Results of the ordered probit for the probability of being financially constrained. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]













Small 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.18*** 0.14*** 0.01
Age (in Ln) -0.03** -0.02 -0.02** -0.01
Number of employees (in Ln) -0.01 0.00
Quoted 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
Manufacturing -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.11***
Construction (omitted)
Services -0.08** -0.08** -0.08** -0.08**
Leverage ratio 0.13** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.17***
Total debt burden 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00
Cashflow (Top 50%) -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.06***
Collateral (Top 50%) -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01
GDP growth -0.001 -.001 -0.001 -0.00 0.00
10 sector dummies NO NO NO YES NO YES
Observations 3059 3059 3059 3059 3059 3059
Clusters 946 946 946 946 946 946
% firms correctly placed 71.4 72.2 72.1 71.3 72.3 71.9
Marginal effects for each covariate, computed at the average level of the other variables, are shown. *** denotes significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5% and * significant at 10%. The dependent variable in the ordered probit model takes a value of 1 if the firms responded 
that a lack of external resources is of low importance in hampering innovative activities; a value of 2 if it is of medium importance and a 
value of 3 if it is very important. In the probit model (column [6]) the dependent variable is set to be one if a firm responded that the lack 


































Table 4. Credit constraints and the cyclical behaviour of R&D investment
Dep. variable: R&D exp./total 
investment
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
ΔSalest -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.014** -0.035** -0.041*** -0.040** -0.020 -0.043** -0.077***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.022)
ΔSalest-1 -0.011*** -0.015*** -0.050*** -0.062*** -0.045*** -0.076***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.019)
ΔSalest-2 -0.006 -0.034** -0.040***
(0.005) (0.016) (0.013)
CreditConst.t-1 0.079 0.083 0.104 -0.002 0.064 0.146
(0.058) (0.058) (0.072) (0.145) (0.137) (0.121)
ΔSalest x CCt-1 0.073** 0.093*** 0.092** 0.031 0.079** 0.157***
(0.032) (0.035) (0.043) (0.033) (0.040) (0.048)
ΔSalest-1 x CCt-1 0.120*** 0.159*** 0.091*** 0.164***
(0.032) (0.044) (0.031) (0.044)
ΔSalest-2 x CCt-1 0.096** 0.091***
(0.041) (0.031)
No. of observations 21676 17828 14196 17506 17485 13917 13892 13874 11085
No. of firms 3270 3141 2556 3103 3101 2523 2524 2521 2063
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Sargan test (p-value) 0.153 0.225 0.487
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. All regressions include sector dummies.


































Table 5. Robustness to different definitions of R&D intensity
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dependent variable: R&D exp./GVA R&D exp./Empl. R&D exp./GOS Ratio R&D Empl. R&D exp./GVA R&D exp./Empl. R&D exp./GOS Ratio R&D Empl.
ΔSalest -0.041** -0.746 -0.354*** -0.004** -0.027** -0.951** 0.005 -0.003***
(0.016) (0.562) (0.071) (0.002) (0.013) (0.469) (0.169) (0.001)
CreditConst.t-1 0.019 1.421 -2.196 -0.019*** -0.195* -6.865* -6.341* -0.036**
(0.021) (1.593) (1.749) (0.006) (0.100) (4.141) (3.772) (0.014)
ΔSalest x CCt-1 0.082** 1.547 0.782*** 0.007* 0.052** 1.827** 0.002 0.006***
(0.032) (1.154) (0.169) (0.004) (0.025) (0.914) (0.382) (0.002)
No. of observations 17518 17518 17518 15572 13909 13909 13909 12288
No. of firms 3103 3103 3103 2879 2525 2525 2525 2333
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01
Sargan test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.191
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. All regressions include sector dummies.
GVA: gross value added; GOS: gross operating surplus.
































       
 
Table 6. The cyclical behaviour of physical investment: levels equation.
Dependent variable: It / Kt-1 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
It-1 / Kt-2 -0.051 -0.051 -0.051 0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
ΔSalest 0.161*** 0.162*** 0.013 0.175** 0.214*** -0.046
(0.050) (0.051) (0.200) (0.080) (0.071) (0.236)
ΔSalest-1 0.241** 0.247*** 0.712 0.153*** 0.151** 0.353
(0.095) (0.095) (0.469) (0.052) (0.059) (0.238)
CreditConst.t-1 -0.269 -0.250 3.404 1.593
(0.314) (0.320) (2.467) (1.977)
ΔSalest x CCt-1 0.376 0.837
(0.504) (0.748)
ΔSalest-1 x CCt-1 -1.339 -0.497
(1.115) (0.521)
No. of observations 17726 17397 17397 14085 13811 13811
No. of firms 3134 3094 3094 2546 2515 2515
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.099 0.102 0.102
Sargan test (p-value) 1.000 1.000 1.000
Within-Groups estimator GMM estimator



































Table 7. Heterogeneous Effects
Dep. variable: R&D exp./total 
investment
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
ΔSalest -0.006** -0.018 -0.008*** -0.025* -0.010*** -0.035**
(0.003) (0.013) (0.003) (0.014) (0.003) (0.015)
ΔSalest x Dt -0.110*** -0.159 -0.111** -0.394 0.001 0.018
(0.040) (0.213) (0.057) (0.262) (0.014) (0.054)
CreditConstt-1 0.083 0.077 0.080
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
ΔSalest x CCt-1 0.039 0.051 0.076**
(0.028) (0.032) (0.033)
ΔSalest x CCt-1 x Dt 0.169 1.113 -0.072
(0.895) (0.939) (0.125)
No. of observations 21676 17506 21676 17506 21676 17506
No. of firms 3270 3103 3270 3103 3270 3103
Adjusted R2
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. All regressions include sector 
dummies.


































Table 8a. The cyclical behaviour of training expenditures.
Dependent variable: training exp. / 
train. exp.+ total investment
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
ΔSalest -0.006** -0.008* 0.001 0.001 -0.006** -0.013*** 0.008 -0.007
(0.003) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.003) (0.005) (0.014) (0.016)
ΔSalest-1 -0.008** -0.120 -0.011*** -0.023**
(0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.011)
CreditConst.t-1 -0.026 -0.024 0.216 0.231
(0.036) (0.036) (0.126) (0.147)
ΔSalest x CCt-1 -0.021 -0.027 -0.037 -0.015
(0.031) (0.035) (0.034) (0.040)
ΔSalest-1 x CCt-1 0.012 0.032
(0.025) (0.027)
No. of observations 19383 15847 15549 15528 15825 12525 12253 12235
No. of firms 3079 2919 2879 2877 2919 2364 2330 2327
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Sargan test (p-value) 0.007 0.053 0.003 0.137
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. All regressions include sector dummies.


































Table 8b. The cyclical behaviour of different intangible assets.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dependent Variable:
ΔSalest -0.040** -0.057*** -0.127*** -0.147*** -0.011 -0.024 -0.044 -0.034
(0.016) (0.018) (0.049) (0.051) (0.014) (0.017) (0.041) (0.041)
ΔSalest-1 -0.028 -0.133*** -0.020 0.003
(0.018) (0.048) (0.015) (0.042)
CreditConst.t-1 0.151 0.159 0.182 0.187
(0.212) (0.210) (0.193) (0.193)
ΔSalest x CCt-1 0.219* 0.279** 0.069 0.024
(0.123) (0.132) (0.112) (0.115)
ΔSalest-1 x CCt-1 0.320*** -0.069
(0.120) (0.101)
No. of observations 10638 9105 8934 8934 10638 9105 8934 8934
No. of firms 2275 2130 2101 2101 2275 2130 2101 2101
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Within-Groups estimator
R&D investment and software applications Franchises, licenses and patents
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. All regressions include sector dummies. The 
period covered in the regressions is 2001 - 2010.
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OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
ηK 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.21***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
ηL 0.63*** 0.62*** 0.64*** 0.64*** 0.61*** 0.59*** 0.61*** 0.61***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
ηC 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ηC1 0.01** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
ηC2 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.01** 0.01**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
σKL -0.73*** -0.68*** -0.55*** -0.53***















Obs. 19734 16564 8424 6266 19734 16564 8424 6266
Firms 3169 3105 2060 1897 3169 3105 2060 1897
Period 91-09 91-09 01-09 01-09 91-09 91-09 01-09 01-09
R2 0.80 - 0.78 - 0.82 - 0.80 -
Table 9. Production Function Estimates
Cobb-Douglas Specification Translog Specification
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively (from one-tailed tests in the case of substitution elasticities). All regressions include sector 
dummies. The Translog production function parameters are not reported for the sake of brevity. η refers to input 
elasticities and σ to Allen substitution elasticities. IV estimates are based on lagged levels of the inputs used as 
instruments for the contemporaneous input values.






Computed as the ratio between R&D spending and the sum of R&D 
spending and investment in physical capital
R&D/GVA R&D spending divided by gross value added
R&D/GOS R&D spending divided by gross operating surplus
R&D per capita
Real R&D spending divided by firm's average employment in year t, 
deflated with value-added sector deflator
R&D personnel Percentage of total employment devoted to R&D activities
Tangible investment
Investment in tangible assets in year t over physical capital stock at 
the end of the previous period, t-1
Training spending
Firm's spending in training divided by the sum of training spending 
and total (tangible and intangible) investment. Available from 1991 to 
2007.
Investment in R&D and IT
Investment in R&D and IT with prospects of success and that can be 
assigned to a specific project. Computed as a share of total 
investment. Available from 2001 to 2009.
Investment in other intangibles
Investment in purchase of patent rights, goodwill, franchises and 




Growth rate of real sales of the firm in year t-1, deflated with a value-
added deflator
Credit Constraint (CC)
Estimated probability that a firm faces financial obstacles which are 
serious enough to hamper its innovative activity. Computed using a 
two-stage approach. In the first stage, an ordered probit was run to 
estimate the relative importance of dummies for young age, small 
size, sector of activity, time dummies and the leverage ratio of the 
firm to explain a positive answer to a survey on financial obstacles to 
innovation (PITEC). The regression was run for firms both in the 
CBSO database and PITEC. In the second stage the estimated 
coefficients and value of the explanatory variables were used to 
estimate the probability of facing financial obstacles for innovation 
investment across all firms in the CBSO database.
FinObst
Response of firms in both PITEC and CBSO database to the 
question "During the two previous years, how important was the lack 
of finance from sources outside your enterprise for hampering your 
innovation activities?" Responses were ranked from 1 (high) to 3 
(low)
Young =1 if a firm has been in operations for less tna 5 years
Small =1 if a firm has less than 50 employees
Quoted =1 if firm is quoted in the stock market
Leverage ratio Firm's interest-bearing external funds to internal funds, at t-1
Cash-flow
Gross operating surplus plus financial interest received over stock of 
capital of the previous period, at t-1
Total debt burden
Short-term interest-bearing debt plus interest paid over cashflow, at 
t-1
Collateral Share of tangible assets in total assets, at t-1
Table A1. Definition of variables
Computing a direct indicator of financial obstacles 
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 Table A2. Sectors included in the empirical sample
CNAE 93 Rev.1* Sector
01, 02 Agriculture and forestry 
05 Fishing
10, 11 Mining, energy products
13, 14 Mining, other minerals
15, 16 Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco
23 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products
24 Manufacture of chemicals
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic products
28, 28 Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment
30, 31, 32, 33 Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment
34, 35 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and other transport equipment
17, 18 Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel 
19 Manufacture of leather and shoes
20 Manufacture of wood and cork
22 Manufacture of paper and printing
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
36, 37 Other manufacturing
40 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply
41 Water collection, treatment and supply
45 Construction
50, 51, 52 Wholesale and retail trade
60, 61, 62, 63, 64 Transport and communications
55 Accommodation and food service activities
70, 71, 72, 73, 74 Real estate activities and professional services
* Spanish National Classification of Economic Activities
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